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Summary
Scholars have expressed concern that the introduction
of substantial coverage of “medical genetics” in the mass
media during the past 2 decades represents an increase
in biological determinism in public discourse. To test
this contention, we analyzed the contents of a randomly
selected, structured sample of American public news-
papers ( ) and magazines ( ) publishedn  250 n  722
during 1919–95. Three coders, using three measures, all
with intercoder reliability 185%, were employed. Re-
sults indicate that the introduction of the discourse of
medical genetics is correlated with both a statistically
significant decrease in the degree to which articles at-
tribute human characteristics to genetic causes (P !
) and a statistically significant increase in the dif-.001
ferentiation of attributions to genetic and other causes
among various conditions or outcomes ( ). ThereP ! .016
has been no statistically significant change in the relative
proportions of physical phenomena attributed to genetic
causes, but there has been a statistically significant de-
crease in the number of articles assigning genetic causes
to mental ( ) and behavioral ( ) charac-P ! .002 P ! .000
teristics. These results suggest that the current discourse
of medical genetics is not accurately described as more
biologically deterministic than its antecedents.
Introduction
For several decades, scholars have expressed concern
that the growth in our knowledge and understanding of
human biology pushes us ever further into a reduction-
istic worldview in which human agency, social structure,
culture, and free will are erased by deterministic for-
mulas that describe human beings as mere animals re-
sponding to the iron laws of physics and evolution (Kaye
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1997, p. 182). Recent dramatic developments in human
genetics research have escalated these concerns, and
scholars from all parts of the academy have begun to
critique both public and scientific discourse about ge-
netics, for its reductionistic biologism and consequent
physical determinism (Lippman 1992; Smith 1992;Hub-
bard and Wald 1993; Nelkin and Lindee 1995; Peters
1997). As Ashkenas (1997) has noted, however, these
critiques have not systematically characterized the de-
terministic components of the public discourse about
genetics across time but instead have relied on highly
subjective anecdotal impressions. Appropriate public-
education programs on human genetics—and appropri-
ate public policies to address the ethical issues that sur-
round human genetics—require accurate assessments of
the nature of the information that is disseminated to the
public via the mass media. This study offers a description
of the trends, across this century, in the deterministic
contents of public discourse about genetics.
There is widespread concern that the increased public
attention to genetics that has occurred in recent years is
resulting in a public ideology that is ever more biolog-
ically deterministic. Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee
(1995) have provided the most thoroughly developed
assertion that this trend exists, and they have labeled it
“genetic essentialism.” They argue that “the images and
narratives of the gene in popular culture reflect and con-
vey a message we will call genetic essentialism. Genetic
essentialism reduces the self to a molecular entity, equat-
ing human beings, in all their social, historical, and
moral complexity, with their genes” (p. 2). Nelkin and
Lindee (1995) argue that genetic essentialism is pervasive
in the mass media, and their book constitutes a catalogue
of examples of salutary, deterministic, and discrimina-
tory discourse about genetics. Nelkin and Lindee do not
clearly indicate whether they believe that genetic science
itself is inherently deterministic, but they insist that pop-
ular discourse about genetics slides into an accounting
for human characteristics that assigns causality solely to
genes. They indicate that “the popular appeal of genet-
ics—focusing on the ‘oracle of DNA,’ the ‘blueprint of
destiny’—lies partly in its image as a predictive science:
a means to uncover predispositions. . . . in the quest to
identify genetic predispositions, however, the statistically
driven concept of correlation is often reduced to ‘cause’”
(pp. 164–168).
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The biologist Ruth Hubbard and her coauthor Elijah
Wald (1993) agree with Nelkin and Lindee. They refer
to genetic essentialism as reductionism, and they argue
that “the myth of the all-powerful gene is based on
flawed science that discounts the environmental context
in which we and our genes exist. It has many dangers,
as it can lead to genetic discrimination and hazardous
medical manipulations” (p. 6). Hubbard and Wald cite
examples of genetic determinism from the popular press
and argue that hereditarian thought has been on the
upswing since the 1970s.
Many other scholars, including the medical profes-
sional Abby Lippman (1992) and the theologian Ted
Peters (1997), have concurred with these arguments.
However, the basis for these concerns remains largely
anecdotal. Nelkin and Lindee rested their claims about
the increasing genetic essentialism of popular discourse
on a collection of materials that was large but was se-
lected to support their central thesis. They made no ap-
parent effort to provide comparative data across time.
None of the other scholars writing about genetics has
provided even that level of research with regard to the
contents of public discourse about genetics. Given the
centrality and criticality of genetics and its impacts on
our vision of ourselves, a systematic description and
analysis of the deterministic contents of mass-media dis-
course about genetics is clearly needed.
Methods
There can be little doubt that statements that defend,
rely on, or presume genetic determinism exist in sub-
stantial numbers in popular discourse. It is more diffi-
cult, however, to assess their relative dominance and the
degree to which this mode of discourse has increased or
decreased, across time, as the revolution in human ge-
netics research has gained increased public funding and
attention. To ascertain these features, we collected sys-
tematic samples of mass magazines, congressional dis-
course, major newspapers, and television news coverage.
Because they offer the largest, most systematic, and most
rigorous sample, the data from the mass magazines are
here reported in detail. Similarities to and differences
from other media will be noted.
Popular U.S. magazines were surveyed in the follow-
ing manner. Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature list-
ings for 1919–95 were divided according to 5-year time
blocks (hereafter called “pentades”). For each pentade,
a total of 50 articles listed under the headings “heredity,”
“genes,” “eugenics,” “defectives,” “sterilization,” and
“genetics” (and variants and subheadings of these) were
selected. In some earlier pentades, somewhat fewer than
50 articles were available. In the later pentades, as many
as 250 articles were available (owing, at least in part,
to the enormous expansion in the number of magazines
covered by the Reader’s Guide); in these periods, articles
were numbered serially, and 50 articles were selected by
means of a random-numbers table. Articles from sci-
entific publications (e.g., Science) and from popular sci-
ence magazines (e.g., Omni and Popular Science) were
excluded from the sample.
A coding system was developed to measure three com-
ponents of genetic determinism: the degree of genetic (or
hereditary) determinism in the articles, the type of fea-
ture to which genetic causality was attributed, and the
degree to which genes were attributed different levels of
influence for various types of conditions (differentia-
tion). The coding system was verified by three paid cod-
ers, who operated independently. Intercoder reliability
rates were established, at 90% for degree, 85% for type,
and 87% for differentiation, over 20% of the discourse
(dispersed across various periods, to insure that relia-
bility remained constant with changing discourse
patterns).
Visual inspection of the data identified four time pe-
riods with distinctive profiles. In the following analyses,
these time periods are represented by 2 pentades each,
to produce parallel periodization and approximately
similar numbers of articles, within the framework pro-
vided by the indexing practices of the Reader’s Guide.
Period 1, the era of eugenics, was ∼1900–35 and is here
represented by the 2 pentades that include 1919–31.
Period 2, the era in which genetics was normalized as a
replacement for eugenics, was ∼1940–55 and is here
represented by the 2 pentades that include 1945–54.
Period 3, an era during which discoveries in molecular
biology gained central attention and during which ge-
netic counseling began to gain widespread public atten-
tion, was 1956–84 and is here represented by the 2 pen-
tades that include 1967–76. Period 4, the era of “medical
genetics” proper, was 1985–95 and is here represented
by those pentades (this era provided the limit case that
required constriction of prior discourse blocks to 2 pen-
tades each, for parallelism). In all cases, deviation from
exact 5-year blocks results from changes in the indexing
procedures of the Reader’s Guide. The trends reported
below are relatively continuous; that is, alternate block-
ing of years generally produces similar results.
Results
The general trends indicate that, contrary to the claims
of the critics, there has not been a significant increase,
over time, in the level of determinism in the public dis-
course about heredity and genetics. Instead, statistical
analysis of these data verifies that more-recent discourse
about genetics has become somewhat less deterministic;
however, careful attention to the details of these features
is necessary. Assessment of the relative dominance of
genetic determinism depends on the type ofmeasure used
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and on one’s interpretation of the optimal description
of the role of genes in human outcomes.
Degree of Determinism
To measure the degree of determinism, coders scored
each article as either attributing human outcomes to the
gene only, attributing outcomes to the gene and to other
factors, or explicitly opposing assignment of causal in-
fluence to the gene. Because Lamarckism was a seriously
debated topic in some pentades, the coders recorded
whether an explicitly pro- or anti-Lamarckian position
was taken. These positions are grouped from high in
determinism (rated “3”) to low in determinism (rated
“1”). Thus, an article that said that “heredity is the sole
potent determiner of the behavior of children” would
be scored as highly deterministic, whereas an article that
said that “genes influence human outcomes along with
environmental concerns” would be scored as moderate
in genetic determinism. Articles that deny any role to
the gene would be scored as lowest in genetic
determinism.
This coding scheme provides only a broad measure of
degree of determinism, since articles within any given
category may include a substantial range of statements.
Typically, articles make between zero and five explicit
statements about the causal influences of genes and/or
environment. If only one of these statements in an article
explicitly attributes influence to the environment,
whereas all other statements attribute influence to the
gene, the article would be assigned to the middle cate-
gory (2; gene  environment). Therefore, a rating of 2
(gene  environment) should not be interpreted as sig-
nifying equivalent emphasis on genetic and environ-
mental factors but merely as signifying that both types
of factors are explicitly acknowledged.
The results indicate that deterministic contents have
not increased over time and have in fact decreased during
the most recent period. The changes in the relative de-
terminism across the time periods are statistically sig-
nificant ( , ) (see table 1).2x [6N  262]  18.06 P ! .001
These trends include the disappearance of a high degree
of polarity, in the early eugenics period (period 1), in
favor of more uniformly genetically deterministic ac-
counts in period 2 (primarily attributable to an enor-
mous shift from pro- to anti-Lamarckism) and in period
3, followed by a statistically significant decrease in
mean genetic determinism between periods 3 and 4
( , ). These data suggest that re-t[129]  2.19 P ! .030
cent media attention to genetics has not been accom-
panied by increased determinism.
Given the breadth of the “genes and environment”
category, it might be suggested that the negative change
in emphasis cited by the critics had occurred via a relative
shift within this category. Qualitative analysis (C. M.
Condit, unpublished data) does not indicate a major
change in relative emphasis, either from gene to envi-
ronment or the reverse. Although there have been sub-
stantial changes in the qualitative framing of the role of
genetics across these eras, these qualitative changes re-
main within a rather stable assignment of relative influ-
ence to genes and environment, bracketed within broad
variance among articles within each period. A quanti-
tative measure that attests to this relative stability is the
articles’ affective positivity toward genetics, which was
surprisingly similar in time periods 1, 3, and 4 (mean
rating on the 1–3 scale was 2.61 for period 1, 2.89 for
period 2, 2.60 for period 3, and 2.60 for period 4 [in-
tercoder reliability 80%]).
Although the lack of increase in determinism is fairly
clear, it is more difficult to offer a definitive interpre-
tation of the relative dominance of genetic determinism
within these periods of discourse. The most frequently
employed discourse throughout all periods has assigned
causality both to genes and to other factors (see table
1). However, in most time periods, causal force is at-
tributed solely to genes in approximately one third of
the articles, whereas articles that deny any role for genes
are virtually absent. Whether this is an appropriate bal-
ance or whether it instead represents excessive deter-
minism will depend on one’s own view of the role of
genes. Moreover, qualitative assessment of the various
models employed in these periods also bears on judg-
ments about the appropriateness of the portrayals.
Types of Characteristics
Perhaps surprisingly, change in the types of charac-
teristics that have been attributed to genetic causes has
also been in a more progressive direction. Table 2 in-
dicates that there has been no statistically significant shift
in the attribution of physical characteristics (e.g., height,
weight, hair color, eye color, or disease) to genetic causes.
However, there have been statistically significant re-
ductions in attribution of mental characteristics (e.g.,
intelligence, mental illness, or mental retardation)
( , ) and behavioral2x [3N  288]  14.95465 P ! .001
characteristics (e.g., personality, criminal propensities, or
moral actions) ( , ) to2x [3N  288]  40.35814 P ! .001
genetic causes. There has been an increase in ambiguous
statements (e.g., genetics is the “secret of life”)
( , ). Overall, across2x [3N  288]  10.39133 P ! .015
time, coders found a consistent trend in which fewer
statements were made that attributed mental and be-
havioral characteristics to genetic causes. In the two
most recent time periods, these trends were statistically
significant only with regard to ambiguous characteristics
( , ). Much of the shift2x [1N  453]  4.28479 P ! .038
away from the attribution of mental and behavioral
characteristics to genes occurred between the middle two
982 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 62:979–984, 1998
Table 1
Relative Degree of Genetic Determinism in Mass Magazines
ARTICLES WITH STATEMENTS THAT
TIME PERIOD
1 (1919–31) 2 (1945–54) 3 (1967–76) 4 (1985–95)
Oppose genetic influence (or pro-Lamarckian) 7 (8.4%) 1 (2.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Attribute influence to both genes
and environment
51 (61%) 28 (58%) 41 (55%) 41 (73%)
Attribute influence to genes only
(or anti-Lamarckian)
25 (30%) 19 (40%) 34 (45%) 15 (27%)
NOTE.— ( ), calculated across all three conditions in all four time periods.2x  18.05857 P ! .006
Table 2
Types of Characteristics Attributed to Genetic Causation, in Mass Magazines
ARTICLES WITH STATEMENTS THAT
LINK GENES TO
TIME PERIOD
x2 P1 (1919–31) 2 (1945–54) 3 (1967–76) 4 (1985–95)
Physical features 64 (65%) 38 (58%) 68 (65%) 55 (59%) 1.670 .644
Mental features 63 (64%) 25 (38%) 52 (50%) 37 (40%) 14.955 .002
Behavior 48 (49%) 13 (20%) 14 (14%) 16 (17%) 40.358 .000
Ambiguous qualities 19 (19%) 23 (35%) 25 (24%) 35 (38%) 10.39 .015
NOTE.—Percentages in columns do not add up to 100% because categories are not mutually exclusive.
time blocks (period 2, 1945–54, vs. period 3, 1967–76).
This finding is important; those unfamiliar with the his-
tory of public discourse about heredity and genetics of-
ten presume that attributions of behavioral and mental
characteristics to genes represent a recent “expansion”
of genetic attributions, whereas such broad attributions
extend back to the earliest eras here surveyed and were
in fact more prominent in earlier eras. Crime, “imbe-
cility,” and promiscuity were regularly attributed to pri-
marily hereditary causes, in the decades before 1965;
however, in terms of absolute representation, a focus on
physical characteristics dominated through all four time
periods.
Differentiation
Critics of genetic discourse tend not to make distinc-
tions between statements that link genes to features that
are most appropriately described as genetic (e.g., eye
color) and features that are more obviously multifac-
torial (e.g., the ability to play a Saint-Saens piano study).
Some critics make no such distinction because they be-
lieve that all mentions of genetic causality are problem-
atic (or even errant [Smith 1992]). However, for those
who believe that some attribution of genetic influence
to human outcomes is appropriate (e.g., Cranor 1994),
a measure of the degree to which popular discourse
makes such distinctions seems to be an important tool.
Table 3 reports the degree to which magazine articles
differentiated among conditions, assigning some char-
acteristics or traits greater degrees of genetic causation
and others lower degrees of genetic causation. In all
periods, nondifferentiation is most prominent. However,
in a subset of articles, nondifferentiation can be attrib-
uted to the fact that only one characteristic is addressed.
Moreover, changes across the four time periods are sig-
nificant ( , ), and the2x [3N  288]  15.88410 P ! .001
trend is clearly toward increasing differentiation. That
is, across time, magazine articles were making finer dis-
tinctions among the relative degrees of genetic influence
on various types of conditions. This would appear to
represent an increasing sophistication about both the
probabilistic character of genetics and the partiality of
its role (see Condit 1997).
Other Media
Sample design for newspapers, news programs, and
congressional discourse is insurmountably problematic
in a variety of ways. There are no consistent national
indexes for newspapers that span these time periods;
indexing of single newspapers varies widely and, for
most newspapers, is relatively recent. Recorded news
programs (obtained from the Vanderbilt Television
News Archives, Vanderbilt University Library, Nash-
ville) are also confined to recent eras. Regrettably, con-
gressional discourse before the 1990s is very poorly in-
dexed. These limitations prevent a controlled
comparison of discourse in these media across time.
Therefore, data collected from these other media are here
used only to assess the degree to which mass magazines
are representative of the broader range of public dis-
course. These data indicate that newspapers are more
deterministic in tone than are magazines; mean degree
of determinism in the magazine sample was 2.32,
whereas mean degree of determinism in the newspaper
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Table 3
Differentiation among Degrees of Genetic Causation for Various Types of Traits, in Mass Magazines
TIME PERIOD
1 (1919–31) 2 (1945–54) 3 (1967–76) 4 (1985–95)
Articles with differentiation 5 (5%) 10 (15%) 17 (16%) 24 (26%)
NOTE.— ( ), calculated across both conditions in all four time periods.2x  15.8841 P ! .001
sample was 2.47. Similarly, across time, levels of differ-
entiation in magazines trended from 5% to 26%,
whereas levels in newspapers trended from 2% to 5%.
Newspapers also do not show the decrease in determin-
ism, across time, that was observed in the magazine sam-
ple. However, they show similar patterns with regard to
types of characteristics attributed to genetic causes.
The discourse of the Congressional Record, although
surprisingly sparse, was also more deterministic (at least
as indexed). Television news programs were present only
in the two most recent time periods. Compared with
magazines, they show less differentiation and a some-
what greater tendency to attribute traits to genes alone
rather than to genes in combination with other factors
(mean degree of determinism 2.55). There was no sta-
tistically significant change, across time, in degree or
differentiation, in television news programs, but types
of characteristics attributed to genetic causes were sim-
ilar to those in the magazines. Generally, therefore, pop-
ular magazines have evolved, to become less determin-
istic in tone, while other media have remained static.
However, all media show similar patterns in the types
of characteristics attributed to genetic influence.
The less genetically deterministic character of themass
magazines may be attributable to their particular func-
tions in public communication. Newspapers and tele-
vision news tend to report immediate events, whereas
magazines tend to discuss those events in larger frame-
works. That newspapers are more representative of pub-
lic impressions of genetics is not self-evident. Newspa-
pers, through their narrow focus on immediate
discoveries and events, appear more often to report only
the activity of the genes. However, when space limita-
tions are eased, as in magazines, representations that
include environmental factors are more common, which
suggests that the broader public understanding includes
environmental influences. Moreover, when audiences are
exposed to “gene-only” discourse, they nonetheless tend
to interpret that discourse in a nondeterministic fashion
(Condit and Williams 1997), which suggests that the
dominant public vision may be the vision represented in
the magazines and that short newspaper articles are read
as subcomponents of the dominant frame. It remains of
potential concern that truncated newspaper reports
might, over time, reconstitute the dominant public un-
derstandings in a narrower way. Whatever the relative
importance of different media and the relative balance
of genetic and environmental attributions within each
medium, trends across time do not indicate an increase
in genetic determinism in any of these media, especially
during the most recent time period.
Discussion
Taken as a whole, this systematic study of the char-
acter and degree of genetic determinism in popular me-
dia does not support statements by critics that contem-
porary attention to genetics represents an increasingly
biologistic determinism. In mass magazines, the trend in
public discussions about genetics is away from a reduc-
tionistic genetic determinism or genetic essentialism. In
other media, the trend is relatively static. These findings
do not bear on whether the current balance of treatment
is appropriate. However, this study suggests that public
translations of scientific research on human genetics can
be accompanied by the development of public vocabu-
laries that recognize the ways in which genetic factors
exert influence on human outcomes without portraying
those factors either simplistically or as all-powerful. Pub-
lic education efforts should encourage development of
such vocabularies.
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